Protection and secure exchange of Web documents is becoming a crucial need for many internetbased applications.
Introduction
The Internet has made possible a wide spectrum of distributed cooperative applications in several areas, such as collaborative e-commerce [15] , distance learning, telemedicine, e-government. A requirement common to many cooperative application environments is the need for secure document exchange. By secure exchange we mean that document confidentiality and integrity are ensured when documents flow among different parties within an organization or within different organizations. Ensuring document confidentiality means that document contents can only be disclosed to subjects authorized according to access control policies agreed upon by the various parties. Ensuring document integrity means that the document contents be correct with respect to a given application domain and that the document contents be modified only by authorized subjects. It is a common case in many application environments that not all parties be authorized to modify any document that is exchanged among these parties. Rather, different parties can be given selective update privileges to different documents, or even different components of the same document. Whereas the problem of documents confidentiality has been widely investigated [8] , the problem of how to ensure that a document, when exchanged among different parties, is modified only according to the stated policies still lacks comprehensive solutions. We believe that such a comprehensive solution requires: 1. A model and a high-level language for specifying update policies -such a model and language are crucial whenever several parties need to state commonly agreed-upon policies according to which documents can be modified by the involved parties.
2. An infrastructure supporting the specification and enforcement of such policies in a distributed environment.
In this paper, we present such a comprehensive solution. We assume that documents to be protected are encoded in XML [16] . We have chosen to cast our approach in the framework of XML documents because of the widespread adoption of such a document standard in a large variety of application environments. However, we believe that our approach can be easily extended to other document exchange formats. The key ingredients of our approach can be summarized as follows. We provide an access control model supporting, besides several document browsing privileges, various authoring privileges, such as deleting and modifying document elements and attributes, or inserting new elements and attributes into documents. These authorization privileges support a fine granularity level of control on document modifications. An important aspect of our access control model is the use of subject credentials. A credential is a set of properties concerning a subject that are relevant for security purposes (for example, the position of the subject within the organization, projects a subject is working on, etc.). Authorizations are then expressed by specifying the subjects receiving the authorizations in terms of conditions against the subject credentials. Subject credentials thus represent a way to support access control based on subject qualifications and profiles. In our model, both credentials and update policies are encoded in XML. Therefore, not only we provide a high-level language for policy representations, but we can also apply the protection mechanisms we provide for regular XML documents to credentials and access control policies. Such a capability is crucial in an environment where credentials and access control policies themselves need to be exchanged among the various parties, for purposes such as access control policy negotiations. Our access control model is complemented by an infrastructure supporting secure cooperative document updates. The basic idea underlying our approach is that the server sends the document to be modified to a given subject; this subject operates on the document and then forwards the document to a second subject and so forth. Each subject 1 upon receiving the document from the server or from the previous subject along the path must be able to modify all and only those portions of the document for which it has a proper authorization according to the specified security policies. The main goal of our approach is to enable a subject, upon receiving a document, to verify whether the updates performed on the document till that point are correct with respect to the stated policies. Our approach is based on the use of hash functions and digital signatures. The proposed document infrastructure is particularly suited for decentralized environments, such as decentralized workflows, mobile systems, agent systems and e-commerce. In such environments, it is not always practical or possible requiring frequent client connections with document servers. The work presented in this paper has been developed in the framework of the Author-X project [2] . Author-X is a Java-based system for access control and security policy design for XML documents. For access control, Author-X supports credential-based policy specifications at varying granularity levels. Additionally, Author-X supports push and pull distribution policies for document release. A number of administration tools are also provided, to facilitate security administration according to the underlying security policies. What we describe in this paper are the techniques and protocols provided by Author-X to enforce distributed document updates. This is a major extension since it requires, besides an extension to the policy specification language, the development of an infrastructure and related algorithms for supporting correct update operations in a distributed environment in which subjects can autonomously verify the correctness of update operations without interacting, in most cases, with the document server. These features were not supported by the previous versions of Author-X and, to the best of our knowledge, they have not been proposed before. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares our work with other proposals. Section 3 briefly summarizes basic concepts of XML and the access control model on which our infrastructure for distributed update relies. Section 4 introduces the architecture for the management of distributed updates, whereas Section 5 presents document encryption as a way to enforce access control. Data structures required to support distributed updates and document dispatching are covered by Section 6, whereas Section 7 describes the protocols used by the subjects and the server to check document integrity, and gives an illustrative example of our approach. Section 8 gives details about the implementation of the document integrity verification protocols. Section 9 reports a complexity analysis of the most relevant operations executed by the proposed protocols, whereas Section 10 discusses possible extensions to the proposed protocols. Section 11 concludes the paper and outlines future research directions. Finally, Appendix A presents correctness results for the subject protocol.
Related work
Several research groups from both academia and industry are currently investigating problems related to security and XML. Work in this field has mainly focused on the development of access control models and encryption techniques for XML documents (an overview of research work and commercial products related to XML security can be found in [8] ). To the best of our knowledge, the work reported in this paper is the first to address the problem of XML document distributed updates. Even though we are not aware of other proposals to which our model can be directly compared, the access control model on which our infrastructure relies has some relationships with access control models and mechanisms developed for object-oriented DBMSs [7, 9] , HTML documents [11] and, recently, XML documents [4] . Additional related work includes the XACML and SAML standards proposed by OASIS [6, 12] . For this reason, in what follows we briefly review these proposals and compare them with our work. The models proposed in [7, 9] are specifically tailored to an object-oriented DBMS storing conventional, structured data. As such, great attention has been devoted to concepts such as versions and composite objects, which are typical of an object-oriented context. Like our model, those models support the concept of authorization propagation, even if our model has a larger variety of authorization propagation options in that it supports three different options by which the Security Administrator (SA) can specify:
i) that an authorization defined at a given level in the XML document hierarchy propagates to all lower levels; ii) that the propagation stops at the first level down in the hierarchy; or iii) that no propagation has to be enforced. By contrast, ORION [9] has only one propagation policy, which is equivalent to the first option. An access control model for WWW documents has been proposed in [11] . In such a model, HTML documents are organized as unstructured pages connected by links. Authorizations can be granted either on the whole document or on selected document portions. Although we borrow from [11] the idea of selectively granting access to a document (by authorizing a subject to see only some portions and/or links in the document), our work substantially differs from this proposal. Differences are due to the richer structure of XML documents with respect to HTML documents and to the possibility of attaching a DTD/XMLSchema to an XML document, describing its structure. Such features require the definition and enforcement of more sophisticated access control policies, than the ones devised for HTML documents. The access control model proposed in [11] has great limitations deriving from the fact that it is not based on a language able to semantically structuring the data, as in our model for XML. As such, authorization administration is very difficult. In particular, if one wants to give access to portions of a document, it has to manually split the page into different slots on which different authorizations are given. This problem is completely overcome by our model because XML provides semantic information for various document components. Authorizations can thus be based on this semantic information. An access control model for XML documents has been recently proposed [4] . Such model is very similar to previous models for object-oriented databases and does not actually take into account some peculiarities of XML. In particular, this model has two main shortcomings. The first is that it does not consider the problem of a secure massive distribution of XML documents and thus considers only the information pull mode for document distribution. Second, the model proposed in [4] does not provide access control modes specific to XML documents. It only provides the read access mode. By contrast, we provide a number of specialized access modes for browsing and authoring, which allow the SA to authorize a subject to read the information in an element and/or to navigate through its links, or to modify/delete the content of an element/attribute. An extensible access control markup language (XACML) has been recently proposed as OASIS standard [6] . There are two main differences between this language and the one on which our model relies. XACML supports the concept of authorization propagation only for the request specification, but it does not support this feature for policy specification. By contrast, our language supports several authorization propagation options for policy specification as already mentioned. Moreover, XACML supports the concept of subject's role [10] , whereas our model is based on the more general concept of subject's credentials. Finally a security assertion markup language (SAML) has also been recently proposed as OASIS standard [12] . This language supports the specification of authorization requests and responses. SAML has a very general notion of protection object in that a protection object is generically a resource, whereas our model is specifically tailored for XML documents. As such SAML is not able to support several features that are relevant to the protection of XML documents. Moreover SAML supports the following types of actions to be exercised on a resource: Read, Write, Execute, Delete and Control; whereas our model supports a greater and more specific set of privileges to be exercised on XML documents, allowing a subject to modify both elements and attributes. Finally, our work includes not only the definition of a language but also the development of a system, able among other things to support certified distributed updates. Note, however, that our approach to enforce secure distributed updates to XML documents can be used also when different document models and update authorization languages are adopted. 
Preliminaries
In this section we first review the basic concepts of XML. We then summarize the basic characteristics of the access control model that our system supports. More details on the model can be found in [2] .
Basic Concepts of XML
Building blocks of XML documents [16] are nested, tagged elements. Each tagged element has zero or more subelements, zero or more attributes, and may contain textual information (data content). Elements can nested at any depth in the document structure. Attributes are of the form name = attvalue, where name is a label and attvalue is a string delimited by quotes. Attributes can have different types allowing one to specify the element identifier (attributes of type ID often called id), additional information about the element (e.g., attributes of type CDATA containing textual information), or links to other elements of the document (attributes of type IDREF/URI referring to a single target or IDREF(s)/URI(s) referring to multiple targets). An example of XML document is given in Figure 1 (a). This document is a monthly report produced by a department, containing an overall description portion that gives some general information, a balance sheet variation that specifies new values concerning some items, and finally an approval portion containing some notes. Based on this nested structure, an XML document can be represented as a graph, as illustrated in Figure 1 (b). In the graph representation, white nodes represent elements, whereas gray nodes represent attributes. A node representing an element contains the element identifier (id). An element identifier can be the ID attribute value associated with the element, or can be automatically generated by the system, if no attribute of type ID is defined (system defined id are represented as &n, where n is a natural number). A node representing an attribute contains its associated value. For simplicity, the data content of an element is represented as a particular attribute whose name is content and whose value is the element data content itself. The graph can contain edges representing the element-attribute and the element-subelement relationships, and link edges, representing links between elements introduced by IDREF/URI attributes. Edges are labeled with the tag of the destination node (i.e., an element or A document type declaration can be attached to XML documents, specifying the syntactic rules that XML documents must follow. These rules are collectively known as the Document Type Definition (DTD) or XML Schema. An XML source is a set of XML documents and associated DTDs/XML Schemas. Throughout the paper, we assume that an XML source S is given.
An Access Control Model for XML Documents
In this section we briefly review the access control model on which the proposed infrastructure relies. We first characterize how subjects are qualified in access control policies. Then, we introduce the concept of protection object, and the access privileges supported by the model. Finally, we introduce propagation options and we show how all the above-mentioned components are used in the specification of access control policies.
Subject.
To better take into account subject profiles in the formulation of access control policies, subjects are qualified by means of credentials. A credential is a set of attributes concerning a subject that are relevant for security purposes. The use of credentials allows the SA to directly express relevant access control policies in terms that are closer to the organizational structure of the enterprise. For instance, by using credentials, one can simply formulate policies such as "Only programmers that are permanent staff can access documents related to the internals of the system". Each subject has one or more associated credentials that are assigned when a subject subscribes to the system. To make the task of credential specification easier, credentials with similar structures are grouped into credential types. Both credentials and credential types are encoded in an XML-based language called X -sec [1] . Figures 2 gives examples of X -sec credentials for the document in Figure 1 . Access control policies specify conditions on credentials and credential properties. These conditions (which are expressed by means of an XPath-based language [18] ) implicitly identify the set of subjects to which a policy applies. Examples of conditions are: All top executive managers, or All secretaries working at the R&D Department.
Protection objects. By protection object we mean the entities to which an access control policy applies. The model provides a wide range of protection objects, in that it is possible to specify policies that apply to: i) all the instances of a DTD/XML Schema; ii) collections of documents; and iii) selected portions within a document(s) (i.e., an element (or a set of elements), an attribute (or a set of attributes), a link (or a set of links)). This wide range of protection objects is complemented by content-dependent access control, that is, the possibility of specifying access control policies based on document content in addition to document structure.
Privileges. Access control policies can be categorized into two groups: authoring policies, that allow To see all the links implied by attributes of type IDREF(s)/URI(s) contained in a protection object. The navigate privilege can also be given on selected attributes within an element. The view the subject has on the referred elements depends on the authorizations the subject has on them Authoring delete attr
To remove an attribute from an element insert attr
To add an attribute to an element update attr
To modify an attribute value insert elemt To insert new elements that are direct subelements of the element on which the insert elemt privilege is specified delete elemt To remove the subtree rooted at the element on which the delete elemt privilege is specified a subject to modify a protection object, and browsing policies, that allow a subject to access the information contained into a protection object. Two browsing privileges are supported: view and navigate, that allow subjects to read the information in a protection object and/or to see the relations occurring among protection objects (defined through IDREF(s)/URI(s) attributes). Authoring privileges allow subjects to modify/delete or insert protection objects. We support five authoring privileges: three at the attribute level -delete attr, insert attr, and update attr and two at the document/element level -insert elemt and delete elemt. The semantics of access privileges is given in Table 1 .
Propagation options.
A further distinguishing feature of our access control model is that a set of propagation options can be exploited in the specification of access control policies. Propagation options specify whether and how a policy specified on a given protection object o propagates to protection objects that are related to o by some sort of relationship. Propagation options are therefore a means to concisely express a set of security requirements. Two different types of propagation are provided: implicit and explicit propagation. Implicit propagation is always applied by default and is based on the following principles: 1) policies specified on a DTD/XML Schema automatically propagate to all DTD/XML Schema instances; 2) policies specified on a given element automatically propagate to all the attributes of the element. In addition to implicit propagation, the SA can state, whether and how a policy specified on a given protection object propagates to lower level protection objects (wrt the document/DTD/XML Schema hierarchy). Three different options are provided for explicit propagation by means of which the SA can specify that: i) no propagation is enacted (no prop option), that is, the policy only applies to the protection objects which appear in its specification; ii) the policy propagates to all direct subelements of the elements in the specification (first level option); iii) the policy propagates to all the direct and indirect subelements of the elements in the policy specification (cascade option). Like credentials, access control policies are encoded using X -sec. We denote with the term Policy Base (PB) the XML file encoding access control policies of the source S. 2 Figure 3 shows a policy base referring to the XML document in Figure 1 . According to the policies in Figure 3 secretaries, managers and accountants working in the R&D department are entitled to see, respectively, the information contained in the monthly report of their department, apart <policy base> <policy spec pid="P1" cred expr="//manager[@department="R&D"]" target="Department montly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]" priv="view" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P2" cred expr="//secretary[@department= "R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]" priv="view" prop="NO PROP"/ > <policy spec pid="P3" cred expr="//secretary[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/overall description" priv="view" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P4" cred expr="//secretary[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/approval" priv="view" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P5" cred expr="//accountant[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/balance sheet variations" priv="view" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P6" cred expr="//secretary[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="//Department monthly report[department="R&D"]/overall description" priv="update attr" prop="NO PROP"/ > <policy spec pid="P7" cred expr="//accountant[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/balance sheet variations" priv="update attr" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P8" cred expr="//accountant[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/balance sheet variations" priv="insert elemt" prop="NO PROP"/ > <policy spec pid="P9" cred expr="//accountant[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/balance sheet variations" priv="delete elemt" prop="FIRST LEVEL"/ > <policy spec pid="P10" cred expr="//company management director" target="Department monthly report.dtd" path="" priv="view" prop="CASCADE"/ > <policy spec pid="P11" cred expr="//manager[@department="R&D"]" target="Department monthly report.xml" path="Department monthly report[@Department="R&D"]/approval" priv="update attr" prop="NO PROP"/ > </policy base> 
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Distributed Updates of XML Documents
Updates to XML documents can be made according to two different modes. Under the first, which is more traditional, a subject wishing to modify an XML document sends a request to the XML document server which, on the basis of the specified authoring policies, decides whether the operation can be authorized (partially or totally) or should be denied. However, there can be cases in which this traditional approach is not adequate or it can be inefficient (since it requires an interaction with the server for each document modification). For these reasons, in this paper we propose an alternative approach to document updates which relies on encryption and digital signature techniques and supports a distributed approach to document updates. The idea is motivated by the fact that often, within an organization, XML documents are subject to pre-defined cooperative update processes (which usually take place at specific periods of times) according to which different organizational roles must modify possibly different portions of the same document. Each subject receiving the document must be able to modify all and only those portions of the document for which it has a proper authorization and then it has to pass the document to another subject for additional operations. The idea is to develop a framework supporting this update mode, able to minimize the interactions with the document server and, at the same time, guaranteeing the correct enforcement of access and authoring privileges on the document. In the following, we first give an overview of the proposed framework. Then we discuss the 
Overview of the update approach
The framework we have developed relies on the use of encryption techniques and consists of using different keys for encrypting different portions of the same document according to the specified access control policies. Each portion is encrypted with one and only one key. The same (encrypted) copy of the document is then sent to a subject belonging to a collaborative group, where by collaborative group we mean a set of subjects that may receive the document for updating or reading it. The document before returning to the server must be seen and/or modified by subjects in the collaborative group, according to a specified set of conditions, called here and in what follows path conditions -for example a manager must be the last subject that receives the document. Each subject in the collaborative group only receives the key(s) for the portion(s) it is enabled to see and/or modify (see Figure 4 for a general overview of the approach) and the path conditions. Such conditions together with other criteria are used by the subject in order to determine the next receiver of the document from the set of subjects in the collaborative group. The approach we propose is distributed in the sense that each subject, under specific assumptions, once receiving the encrypted document, is able to verify, without interacting with the server, whether the operations performed till that point on the document are correct (that is, they do not violate the access control policies of the source). This goal is obtained by attaching to the encrypted document additional control information, with the purpose of making a subject able to verify the correctness of the updates performed so far on the document, without the need of interacting with the document server. The encrypted document and the control information form the document package.
To support this update schema, we propose the architecture shown in Figure 5 which consists of five main components. The document is first processed by a Parser which, on the basis of the specified policies, analyses the document structure and groups document portions according to the policies that Figure 5 : Distributed document updates: overall schema apply to them. The result is the package structure, containing the document content already grouped according to the above-mentioned strategy together with the control information structure, that is incrementally updated during the package generation process. Such structure contains some control information , that are needed by subjects to verify update correctness. Additionally, it generates a table, named Key Info, which contains information on the generated groups and their corresponding portions. Both the package structure and the Key Info table are received as input by the Encryption Module, that generates a symmetric key for each group, and stores it in the Key Info table. Then, it encrypts all the document portions with the corresponding keys. The result is the package containing both the encrypted document and the control information structure, and the updated Key Info table. The package is received as input by the Control Information Generator that generates a set of additional control information which are stored in the control information structure. The Dispatcher is in charge of generating the completed document package, containing both the encrypted version of the document and the control information, and of sending it to the first chosen subject belonging to the collaborative group. By contrast, symmetric encryption keys are separately sent to each subject. Finally, the Recovery Manager receives recovery requests from subjects and sends back to the subjects, at the end of a recovery procedure, the last correct version of the package. In Section 5 we describe the main components of the proposed architecture.
Assumptions
It is important to note that our approach relies on a set of assumptions that we discuss in what follows. We assume that each time a subject detects that a portion of the package is inconsistent (that is, a previous subject has operated on that portion violating the policies in PB) the subject sends a recovery request to the document server (D s ) to obtain the last correct version of the package. This implies that we assume no collusion among the subjects and that, whenever a subject sbj updates a document portion (with proper authorizations and after the execution of the document content integrity check protocol), sbj is sure of the integrity of that portion. Moreover, we assume that a subject sends the package to only one subject in the collaborative group, that is, we do not allow a subject to simultaneously send a package to more than one subject. Additionally, to prevent a subject from inserting old versions of document portions into a package we assume that if the receiver s r of the package has already received the package the sender, instead of sending the package to subject s r , sends it to D s that updates some control information and then sends the package to subject s r . This is done to prevent the closure of a cycle in the path followed by the document d, which would allow subject s r to insert some portions of old versions of d in the package, without being detected by any other subject. Finally, we assume that each subject knows the public key of all the subjects belonging to the collaborative group.
Document Encryption
A trivial solution for generating the encryption of a document d, denoted in the following as d e , able to support our approach is to encrypt the document at the finest granularity level, that is, to encrypt each attribute and element of the document with a different key. This solution, although very easy to implement, may require the generation and distribution of a very large number of keys. To limit the number of keys that need to be generated, we have adopted an alternative approach in which the portions of a document to which the same policies apply are encrypted with the same key. This ensures that it is always possible to deliver to each subject all and only the keys corresponding to the portions of the documents for which it has an authorization, minimizing at the same time the number of encryption keys to be generated. Here we do not go into the details of the techniques developed to support this strategy and we only give the intuition behind them. We refer the interested reader to [3] for further details. The encryption of a document consists of two main phases: the first, called marking phase, marks each protection object in the source with the identifiers of the applicable policies, whereas in the second phase the document is encrypted based on the results of the first phase. Marking can apply not only to whole protection objects (i.e., attributes and/or elements), but also to the start and end tags of an element only. This possibility allows one to correctly encrypt elements containing attributes to which different policies apply. As an example consider an element e containing two attributes a 1 and a 2 , and suppose that policies acp 1 and acp 2 apply to a 1 , whereas acp 3 applies to a 2 . Thus, the view to be returned to a subject to which both policy acp 1 and acp 2 apply is equal to element e from which all the attributes different from a 1 have been removed, whereas the view to be returned to a subject to which only acp 3 applies is the element obtained from e by removing all attributes different from a 2 . Thus, in the document encryption attributes a 1 and a 2 must be encrypted with different keys, since different policies apply to them. Additionally, another key must be used to encrypt the start and end tags of e that are to be returned to all the subjects entitled to access an attribute of element e. This leads to the definition of atomic element, which denotes the basic portions of an XML document to which encryption can be applied. While an attribute corresponds to a single portion of a document d (the attribute name and its value, or only the value for data content), elements consist of two or three non-contiguous components depending on the type of the element. Empty-elements, that is, elements of the form (<tag-name ... />) consist of two components: the first part of the tag name ("<tag-name") and its end ("/>"). All other elements consist of three components: the first part of the start-tag ("<tag-name"), its end (">"), and the end-tag ("</tag-name>"). This information is important because for each atomic element ae it is necessary to define where ae's components are located in the original document. Figure 1 are: a) &1.Date corresponding to: "Date = "10/1/2002""; b) &8.content corresponding to: "10K"; c) &5.tags corresponding to:
Example 2 Example of atomic elements in the XML document in
A marking for a document d is thus a set of pairs (ae, P), where ae ∈ AE(d), and P is a set of access control policy identifiers. The encryption algorithm groups atomic elements with the same marking and generates a different encryption key for each distinct group, which is used to encrypt all the members of the group. To limit as much as possible the size of the information that circulates among subjects, the encrypted document d e , delivered to the various subjects, consists only of the encryption of the marked atomic elements and does not contain non marked components of the document, since these components are not accessible by any subject. The set of atomic elements which are encrypted with the same key is called a region. We assume that each region is uniquely identified by an identifier. In the following, given an XML document d we denote with R(d) the set of identifiers of the regions of d implied by the policies in PB. Key information are stored into table Key info which records, for each region in a document, the set of atomic elements that compose the region, the identifiers of policies that apply to that region, and the corresponding encryption key. Figure 1 , according to the policies in Figure 3 . Our system supports several methods for key delivery [2] and the SA can select the most appropriate one depending on the characteristics of the document and of the receiving subjects. Key delivery strategies supported by our system can be classified into two main categories: online and offline. In the online mode both the keys and the package are sent to the subjects by D s (together or separately), whereas in the offline mode keys are stored in an LDAP directory [13] at D s and subjects retrieve the necessary keys by querying the directory.
Example 3 Table 2 shows the content of table Key info associated with the document in
Generation of Control Information
After the XML document has been encrypted, the next step is to generate the control information, to be used during the document flow for verifying the correctness of the updates performed on the document. The Control Information Generator module (see Figure 5 ) generates this information for each region of the document and corresponding atomic elements. The generated information differs depending on the access control privileges that can be exercised on a region. For this reason we distinguish between modif iable and non-modifiable regions. Modifiable regions are those whose contents can be modified according to the policies in PB. A region r is thus modifiable if, among the policies that apply to r, there exists at least a policy whose access control mode is either delete attr, delete elemt or update attr. By contrast, a non-modifiable region is a region whose original contents cannot be changed according to the policies in PB. Thus, a region is non-modifiable if the access control modes of all the policies that apply to that region belongs to the set: {view, navigate, insert attr, insert elemt}. Note that operations corresponding to insert attr and insert elemt privileges alter the document content by inserting a new element and/or attribute; however, unlike the operations corresponding to the delete attr, delete elemt, and update attr privileges, they do not modify the original region, but they can add one or more new regions to the document. Because of this characteristic, they have been inserted among the privileges related to non-modifiable regions. The sets of the identifiers of nonmodifiable and modifiable regions of a document d are denoted by NMR(d) and MR(d), respectively. To enable a subject to verify the integrity of a document content we need different control data structures for non-modifiable and modifiable regions. In particular, the content of the structures for non-modifiable regions is statically defined by the document server when the document is delivered to the first subject in the collaborative group and it is not altered by subjects during document transmission. By contrast, the content of structures for modifiable regions changes dynamically according to the updates made on the atomic elements belonging to those regions. In what follows, we refer to policies whose access control modes are in the set Authoring-privileges = {update attr, delete attr, delete elemt, insert attr, insert elemt} as authoring access control policies.
In the remainder of this section we describe in details the control information associated with document regions. Before, presenting this information, we need to introduce the notion of authoring certificate, which plays an important role when dealing with modifiable regions.
Authoring Certificates
Authoring certificates are used by a subject, that has modified a document portion, to prove its right to modify that document portion to the subsequent receivers of the document. Therefore, whenever a subject modifies a document (or a document portion), it has to add the proper authoring certificates to the document control structures. Certificates are generated by the sever according to the access control policies in PB. An authoring certificate consists of: an authoring privilege p, the id of a subject that can exercise p, and the set of atomic elements on which the subject can exercise p. Authoring certificates are formally defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Authoring Certificate).
Let d be an XML document in S, and let Auth P (d) be the set of authoring access control policies that apply to document d. Let Sbj be the set of identifiers of subjects authorized to access documents in S. An authoring certificate ac is a tuple (priv, sbj id, prot obj), digitally signed by the document server, where: priv ∈ Authoring-privileges; sbj id ∈ Sbj; prot obj is a pair (r id, at el), such that r id ∈ R(d) 4 , and at el is a set of atomic element identifiers belonging to r id. 2
In the following, we denote with the term valid certificate an authoring certificate generated according to the policies in PB. More precisely, an authoring certificate ac=(priv, sbj id, prot obj) is valid if subject sbj is authorized to exercise privilege priv over the set of atomic elements identified by prot obj according to the policies in PB. Moreover, given a subject s, we denote with Cert(s) the set of valid certificates of subject s, for the documents in S wrt the policies in PB. The document server takes care of sending the certificates to the subjects according to one of the following modes: on-line; partially on-line; off-line. The on-line mode is based on an on-demand method for the certificates generation and distribution. This mode implies the generation of a certificate and its delivery only when it is strictly needed. However this mode has the drawback that the document server can become a bottle-neck. The partially online mode provides the generation of the authoring certificates needed by the first subject and by all the other subjects that must receive the package as specified in the path conditions generated by the document server. Also in this case the document server can become a bottle-neck, even if the number of certificate requests addressed to the server is lower. The last mode, the off-line one, provides the preventive generation and distribution of all authoring certificates. Though this strategy could be expensive, it can be executed during the periods in which the working load for the server is lower (e.g. during the night), preventing the server from becoming a bottle-neck. The mode is chosen taking into account the average number of simultaneously active processes, because a high number of processes active at the same time can cause the server to become a bottle-neck. 
Example 4 Consider three users
Control data structures for document regions
The Control Information Generator module generates different data structures for non-modifiable and modifiable regions. Since non-modifiable regions cannot be altered during the document flow, the control data structure for non-modifiable regions simply contains a hash value for each non-modifiable region. This value is computed by the server before sending the package to the first subject. The idea is that, when a subject wishes to verify the integrity of a non-modifiable region it locally computes the hash value and compares it with the one stored in the data structure. If the two hash values differ, then the region has been modified by a non-authorized subject and thus the document is corrupted. The control data structure for non-modifiable regions also contains the encryption of the content and the control information associated with the atomic elements belonging to non-modifiable regions. Table  3 presents the control data structures for non-modifiable regions of a generic document d in terms of their notation, structure and semantics, whereas Table 4 explains the semantics of the components of the control data structures introduced in Table 3 . it specifies where ae's components are located in the original document d and it is computed by counting, for each component of ae, the components that precede it in d. This is done by executing a pre-order depth-first left-to-right tree traversal of the graph representation of the document d and assigning a progressive integer number to each atomic element component considered during the traversal. It is important to note that when an element e has some attributes and some children elements the tree traversal assigns, an integer number to the first part of the start-tag of e, one to each attribute of e, one to the end part of the start-tag of e, one to all the atomic element components contained in the children elements, and one to the end-tag of e. encrypted-content it contains the encryption of the content associate with the atomic element identified by ae id Control information for modifiable regions is more complex than the one for non-modifiable regions because modifiable regions may change dynamically during document flow. Therefore it is not possible to compute only once the hash value for integrity verification. Such a hash value must be recomputed each time the document is modified to allow a subject to verify the correctness of the modifications performed so far on the document. By correctness of the modification we mean that if a subject has modified the document, then it must have the proper authorization. Thus the control information for modifiable regions changes dynamically during the package flow from one subject to another to reflect the operations performed on the document. To make possible the integrity verification of a region the protocol must record information about the last two subjects that have received the package and have an authoring or browsing privilege on that region. More precisely, the control data structure contains, for each region, information on the last two subjects that have confirmed or modified the region, denoted in the following as s last and s last−1 , respectively. We say that a subject s confirms a modifiable region when it verifies the integrity of the region, without modifying it, and a subject s last , different from s, has modified that region. In particular if a subject s performs a confirmation operation, it establishes that the updates executed by subject s last are correct wrt to the policies in PB. By contrast, a subject s modif ies a modifiable region, when it exercises some authoring privileges over it. Maintaining information concerning the last two subjects is necessary because a subject s, before exercising a privilege over a modifiable region, must be able to verify its integrity. To perform this control subject s must know the state of the region when s last−1 has sent the package to the next subject, the set of elements belonging to the region that s last has modified, grouped by the privilege exercised on them, and information about the authorizations of s last over that region. All these information are contained in the data structure for modifiable regions. Before introducing the data structures for modifiable regions, we must introduce an additional information, called cycle path, that the Control Information Generator inserts into the document package. This information is used by the document server when the package returns to the server for recovery. It denotes the number of cycles that the package has traversed, till that point. A cycle occurs when a package reaches a subject that has already received it before. Cycle path is used to avoid that a subject, upon receiving a document, inserts in the received version of the document an old version of a document portion. The control data structures for modifiable regions also contain the encryption of the content and the control information associated with the atomic elements belonging to modifiable regions. The control data structures for modifiable regions of a generic document d is introduced in Table 5 , Table 6 we explain the semantics of the components of the control data structures introduced in Table 5 . Among the control information associated with a modifiable region, certif icates represents a relevant component. This component contains information about exercised privileges and involved atomic elements. More precisely, component certif icates contains the set of authoring certificates belonging to the subject that has modified the content of the modifiable region, and the set of atomic elements in the considered region actually modified. In particular this component is updated according to the following strategy. When a subject s wishes to exercise the delete elemt privilege it has to insert into certificates, for each region that has some atomic elements belonging to the subtree to be deleted, its own certificate for the delete elemt privilege on the subtree to be deleted. Moreover if there exists at least one atomic element already deleted by a previous subject in that region, it has to insert in that component the set of atomic elements, belonging to the subtree to be deleted, that have not been yet deleted. This is necessary because, during the execution of the subject protocol, the set of atomic elements that have been deleted by the last subject that has modified a region needs to be exactly determined. When a subject s exercises an authoring privilege operation different from delete elemt over a modifiable region r id, it has to insert in the component certificates of the tuple relative to r id its own certificate for that privilege and the set of atomic elements actually modified. Other relevant control information are represented by control hash values computed over a given region. This information includes the components: prev r h, prev r dig h, last r h, last r dig h. Those information are particularly relevant for the integrity verification process and are updated during a conf irmation or a modif ication operation. A conf irmation is executed by a subject s by replacing information in components associated with s last−1 with those in components associated with s last and by inserting in components associated with s last information about itself, by setting component certif icates to null, and by leaving unmodified the control hash values. There is a control hash value for each atomic element ae belonging to a modifiable region of d calculated over the encryption of ae s content and recorded in a component denoted as h ae. During a confirmation the subject that confirms a modifiable region has to re-compute the hash values, contained in components h ae, corresponding to atomic elements that were modified by subject s last , to reflect the new values of the atomic elements. By contrast, a modif ication requires a proper update of the control information by subject s. In particular, if subject s was the last subject that has previously confirmed or modified that region 5 , then it executes a modif ication by inserting in the components associated with s last information regarding Figure 6 illustrates a possible path followed by a document d and in particular the value of the most relevant components of the control data structure MR d corresponding to the region with identifier r n. Subject S X modifies region r n by copying information on the document server (D s ) into the components associated with s last−1 and by inserting in the components associated with s last its identifier and its valid certificates. Subject S Y has no access to that region and thus it does not modify it. Subject S Z , after having verified the integrity of the region, modifies it by executing the same procedure performed by subject S X . Finally S T verifies the region content and confirms it, by copying the information in components corresponding to s last into those corresponding to s last−1 , and by inserting its identifier in component s last . 
Generalized control information
The Generalized control information consists of some information, called path of document d and contained in the package, listing the set of subjects that have received the package, and of an hash value, denoted as H NMI , computed over a set of information called non-modifiable information and signed by the document server with its private key. This non-modifiable information can be modified only by the document server and corresponds to: cycle path, all control information over non-modifiable regions and atomic elements, the components (ae id, position, r id) in all tuples in the control structure for modifiable atomic elements, and the component r id in all the tuples in the control structure for modifiable regions. The path of document d is used to rebuild as much as possible the path followed by the package, when an error is detected, whereas the hash value is used to check the integrity of the information that are modifiable only by the document server. The path of document d is incrementally updated as the package flows from one subject to another. When a subject receives the package, it inserts in the structure a tuple containing its identifier, a counter which keeps track of how many subjects have already received the package, and the identifier of the subject to which it delivers the package. Moreover, the tuple contains an hash value, signed by the subject with its private key, computed over all the tuples in the structure. Once the Control Information Generator has initialized the above control data structures for an encrypted document d e , the Dispatcher module generates the package to be sent to the first subject. Figure 7 provides a graphic representation of a package P d . After the creation of the package P d , the Dispatcher, first of all, locally stores a copy of the package to be used during recovery operations, then signs the package with the private key of D s and sends it to the first subject, using the SSL protocol [14] .
Subject and Server Protocols
In this section we present the protocols executed by a subject and by the server during a distributed and collaborative update process for an XML document. In particular Section 7.1 describes how a subject performs the correctness check for a received package, how it exercises its update rights over the received document and which steps it must follow to send a package to another subject. Section 7.1 also shows an example of the subject protocol execution. Section 7.2 describes how the server manages a recovery request raised by a subject.
Subject Protocol
A subject sbj, according to the chosen key delivery strategy and certificate dissemination mode, obtains from D s a set of keys, and a set of corresponding region identifiers, enabling it to decrypt the portions of the document d it is able to access. Additionally, sbj receives from D s the set of its authoring certificates, generated according to the access control policies in PB, from which it can determine which privileges can be exercised and on which atomic elements of d.
The subject protocol consists of three main steps: 1) verification of the package integrity and authentication, 2) package update, and 3) package delivery to the next subject. Section 7.1.1 presents an algorithm for performing step 1, whereas Section 7.1.2 summarizes the strategies we have devised for steps 2 and 3. Finally Section 7.1.3 presents a possible update scenario.
Package integrity and authentication
A subject sbj, upon receiving a package, verifies its authenticity and the integrity of the corresponding control information and of the document content it is authorized to access. If no errors occur during this phase, sbj decrypts all the portions of d it is able to access with the received decryption keys.
Algorithm 1 An algorithm for verifying package integrity and authenticity
INPUT:
The package P d coming from a subject sn The receiver subject sbj OUTPUT: A package P d containing both correct control structures and correct document content METHOD: Then, it can exercise over the decrypted portions all the privileges derived by its authoring certificates. By contrast, if an error is detected, sbj sends a recovery request to D s to obtain the last correct version of the package. The steps executed to verify package integrity are presented in the algorithm in Figure  8 , whereas Figure 9 gives a graphic representation of the main steps of the algorithm. The overall strategy of the algorithm is to verify the authenticity and the integrity of the received package and of the associated data structures by locally calculating some hash values over the package, by decrypting the hash values contained in the document package P d with the public key of the subjects that have already received the package and by verifying the correspondence between the locally calculated hash values and the decrypted ones. If these values are different, the package is considered incorrect and thus is not accepted. A recovery request is raised by the protocol to obtain another package containing the last correct version of the portions detected as corrupted. The algorithm starts (step 3) with the integrity verification of the package by extracting the package signature and comparing it with an hash value locally computed over the same elements. If the two values are different the algorithm requests the sender subject to send the package again. Otherwise, the algorithm verifies the correctness of the content of non-modifiable information through the comparison of [not corrupted]
[corrupted]
[not corrupted]
[not corrupted] Figure 9 : Main steps of the package integrity and authenticity algorithm an hash value (h nmi) computed over these information with the one stored in the package (step 3.a). 6 The check operated over P ath d (step 3.a) consists of the verification of the correct correspondence between the subject identifier in a tuple (s id next) and the corresponding one (s id c) in the next tuple in the structure. Moreover, all hash values contained in the tuples must be correct, that is, each component h control , decrypted using the public key of the subject specified in the component s id c, must be equal to that calculated by the algorithm over the information specified in Definition 6.2. Finally, the last subject specified in P ath d must be equal to the sender of the received package, to prevent a subject from intentionally not inserting itself in P ath d , with the purpose of inserting old versions of document portions when it receives again the package. The correctness of this structure is important during the execution of the recovery operations, because it is used to rebuild as much as possible the path followed by package P d (for more details see Section 7.2). If an error occurs the algorithm sends a recovery request to D s to receive a correct version of the package. Then, the algorithm verifies the integrity of the atomic elements belonging to non-modifiable regions for
Update of control data structures according to the operations executed over the document and to the used certificates (following the criteria explained in Section 6.2)
Encryption of the new version of document d and insertion of it in the package to be sent to the next subject Insertion in the updated package of a new tuple in the structure Path d with the information regarding the sender subject Signature of the package by the sender subject; delivery of the package to the next subject; and storage of the package in the local source of the sender Figure 10 : Update and delivery processes which sbj has an authorization (step 3.b) using the same strategy presented above. If an error occurs the algorithm sends a recovery request to D s . If no error is detected, the algorithm verifies the integrity of atomic elements belonging to modifiable regions (step 3.c) by verifying, for each modifiable region r such that sbj has an authorization on it, the authenticity and the integrity of the information inserted by the last two subjects s last−1 and s last . If the region is confirmed (step 3.d), its content must be correct with respect to the hash value stored in component last r h and with respect to that in component prev r h. Moreover the hash values in components h ae, referring to the atomic elements belonging to that region, must be correct with respect to the hash values stored in last r dig h and prev r dig h. If a region is modified (step 3.e), then by using the hash value in component prev r dig h and the one in the components h ae of the atomic elements belonging to that region, the algorithm can build the state of the region before the modification and then verify that the operations performed over it are correct with respect to that state. This is executed by checking that the atomic elements which have not been declared as modified (in the component certif icates) have maintained their previous values and verifying that the updated atomic elements were modified according to the declared privileges (those contained in the certificates inserted in component certif icates). In each of the above cases if an error is detected, a recovery request is sent to D s to obtain a correct package. Finally, Algorithm 1 returns a package P d , containing both correct control structures and correct document content. A copy of this package is stored for recovery purposes (together with the id of the sender subject, the corresponding value of prog component in P ath d and the current value of cycle path) by the receiver in its local store.
Package update and delivery
After a subject s has executed Algorithm 1 on a document package P d , it can read or modify the regions of document d for which it has some authorizations. Then s must update the data structures to keep track of the operations it has performed on document d and send the updated package to the next subject in the collaborative group that satisfies the received path conditions. The operations performed in these steps are graphically summarized in Figure 10 . A subject can locally exercise all privileges, authorized by its certificates, apart from privileges insert attr and insert elemt. These privileges must be executed by D s , because the corresponding operations could generate new regions. In this case a subject s must send the package, and new portions it wishes to insert into the document d to D s , that takes care of executing these operations and sending the updated package to the specified receiver. In particular, new inserted atomic elements are marked according to the policies in PB by D s and then inserted in the corresponding new or old region according to their marking. For each newly created region a new entry in the table Key info is inserted, whereas control information corresponding to each old region to which new atomic elements have been added is updated to reflect the new content of the region. If the receiver s r of the package is already present in the structure P ath d , the sender instead of sending the package to subject s r , sends it to the D s that updates the value of cycle path and of the other involved structures, appends the content of the structure P ath d in a local store, re-initializes the P ath d structure and then sends the package to subject s r . We do such steps to prevent the closure of a cycle in the path of document d. Such an event would allow subject s r to replace some portions of d in the package with old ones, without being detected by any other subject.
An Illustrative Example
In this section we discuss the example reported in Figures 11, 12 , and 13. We focus on the operations executed by some subjects over the atomic elements and control data structures belonging to region R1. In particular that region is composed by three atomic elements with identifiers 1, 3, and 8, respectively. At the beginning of the process the region is covered only by the hash values computed by D s , therefore the components in the MR d control data structure associated with s last−1 are empty (value null). When S M receives the package, region R1 was never modified. This subject possesses two certificates for that region: one containing the update attr privilege and the other containing the delete attr privilege. First of all the subject checks the integrity of that region by computing two hash values, one over the encrypted contents of the atomic elements belonging to region R1 (h1), and the other over the h ae . . .
S P
S P has only a view privilege over R 1 S P checks the integrity of R 1 : it checks the integrity and authenticity of the inserted certificates ( ac1 , ac2 ) it locally computes : h1 = H(h_ ae (1), h_ ae (3), h_ ae (8) components associated with those atomic elements (h2), and then checks that h1 and h2 match the hash values, last r h and last r dig h, associated with R1 and stored in the MR d control data structure. Finally, S M updates the atomic element 1, deletes the atomic element 8, updates the corresponding control information in MR d and sends the updated package to another subject. After a certain number of subjects the package reaches S P , that can only view the content of region R1. S P checks the integrity of R1 by executing the following steps:
• It checks the integrity and authenticity of the inserted certificates (ac1, ac2). Then it determines the set of updated atomic elements belonging to region R1, corresponding to 1 and the set of deleted atomic elements belonging to R1 corresponding to 8. Such sets of atomic elements are obtained by using the information contained in the component certificates of the tuple associated with region R1 belonging to the MR d control data structure. Obviously if a certificate with privilege different from update attr, delete attr or delete elemt is found in the certificates component, an error is raised.
• It locally computes some hash values. Hash value h1 is computed over the h ae components associated with the atomic elements belonging to R1 not yet deleted or declared as deleted in component certificates associated with s last ; h2 is computed over the encrypted content of the atomic element 3, because it has not yet been deleted and it is not declared as modified in component certificates associated with s last ; h3 is computed over the encrypted content of all the atomic elements of R1 not yet deleted; h4 is computed over the encrypted content of the updated atomic element 1; h5 is computed over the component h ae associated with atomic element 3 and h4, that are the hash values computed over the atomic elements of R1 not yet deleted.
• It compares hash value h1 with the component prev r dig h in MR d . The correspondence between these two assures that no subject has modified the values associated with the h ae components.
• It compares hash value h2 with the component h ae associated with the atomic element 3. Their correspondence and the satisfaction of the previous check assure that the content of the atomic element 3 was not modified.
• It checks that the atomic elements declared as updated or deleted belong to the set of atomic elements contained in the inserted certificates (ac1, ac2), and that the region specified in those certificates is R1, and finally that each atomic element declared as deleted has a null value in its encrypted-content component. These conditions assure that S M possesses the proper rights to update and delete atomic elements 1 and 8, respectively, and that atomic element 8 was really deleted.
• It compares hash value h3 with the component last r h in MR d . The correspondence between them assures that no subject had modified the content associated with the atomic elements of R1 not yet deleted, after the modification executed by S M .
• It compares hash value h5 with the component last r dig h in MR d . The correspondence between them assures that components last r dig h and last r h cover the same content associated with the atomic elements of R1 not yet deleted, in an indirect mode, the former one, and in a direct mode, the latter one.
Before sending the package to the next subject, S P confirms region R1 by: updating the value of the components h ae corresponding to its modified atomic elements 1 and 8; moving the information associated with the components in MR d associated with s last into those associated with s last−1 ; and inserting into the components associated with s last the hash values that cover directly (last r h) and indirectly (last r dig h) the current content of the atomic elements, together with the identifier of S P . Finally, subject S Current receives the package and checks its integrity. Since region R1 is a confirmed one, S Current must locally compute a hash value (h1) over the encrypted content of the atomic elements of R1 not yet deleted and another one over the corresponding h ae components. Then, S Current checks that those hash values match both the ones stored in the components associated with s last in the MR d control data structure and the other ones stored in the components associated with s last−1 . These conditions assure that no subject after S P has modified the region content and also that S P itself did not modify the content of the region.
Server Protocol
When a subject detects that a package is compromised, it requires from the server a correct version of the document package. In particular, there are two types of recovery requests that a subject may send to the document server. The first type of recovery request is sent when an error to the generalized control information has been detected. In this case the server protocol checks the structure P ath d , in the received package attached to the request, and saves the portion of it that is correct. Then, it sends each subject in the collaborative group a message by which it requires the structure P ath d of the package (if any) they have stored, having the value of cycle path equal to the current value stored by the server. By checking (following the criteria explained in Section 7.1.1) the received structures P ath d , and by matching them with the correct portion of that one in the corrupted package, the server rebuilds as much as possible the path (denoted in the following as rebuilt-path) followed by the package. This is executed by considering the structures P ath d , obtained from the subjects, in ascending order with respect to the number of subjects they contain. The path saved by the server is matched with the first structure P ath d . Every match generates a partially rebuilt-path which is used in the subsequent matches. Such path consists of the subjects which appear in both paths and of the subjects contained in the path with the highest number of subjects. The rebuilding process terminates when there are no more paths to evaluate or when two paths have, in a tuple, equal value for component prog and different values in one of the other components. Now it is possible to find the last correct version of the package by requiring the subjects listed in the rebuilt-path (beginning from the one with the highest value in the component prog and stopping the requesting process when a correct version is found) their last sent and stored package having the value of cycle path equal to that one stored by the server. Finally, the server appends the rebuilt-path to the path (denoted as global-path) already saved in a local store, re-initialize the Path d structure, updates the value of cycle path as well as the data structures of the received package and sends this updated package to the subject that has required the recovery. The second type of recovery request is sent when an error in the content of a region is discovered. In this case if the error affects only non-modifiable regions, the server can directly solve the problem without the help of other subjects, because it has stored the original value of this information in its local repository. It can thus replace the corrupted information with the saved ones. Otherwise, if the P ath d structure has been compromised the server rebuilds the last portion of the path followed by the package, by using the strategies explained above. In any case the server, by using the information in table Key Info, selects the subjects from which it requires a package containing the last correct version of the corrupted modifiable regions. The request process is executed starting from the selected subject with the highest value in component prog in the global-path obtained appending the rebuilt-path to the one already saved and stopping the process when a correct version of the region is found or the selected subject has a value in component prog less than the one of the subject that has received the last correct version of the region found and saved by the server during a previous recovery session. If a correct version of the region is not found through this process the initial version of the region is inserted into the package. Finally, the server re-initialize the Path d structure, updates the value of cycle path as well as the data structures of the received package and sends this updated package to the subject that has required the recovery.
System Implementation
The protocols described in the previous sections are currently being implemented in the framework of the Author-X system [2] . Author-X is a java-based system supporting selective, secure and distributed dissemination of XML documents. Its architecture, presented in Figure 14 , is based on the client-server paradigm. The server system, built on top of the eXcelon XML data server [5] , manages all information required for controlling access to documents. In particular the server database is organized in terms of five repositories: the Policy Base (PB), the Credential Base (CB), the Encrypted Document and Management Information Base (EDMIB), the XML Source, and the Authoring Certificate Base (ACB). In addition to the database, the server includes the following main components: X -Admin, X -Access, and X -Update. We briefly describe the first two, and then focus on the last one which implements the protocols defined in this paper. The X -Admin component provides functions supporting administrative operations, such as for instance specifying or modifying policies, or updating credentials. The X -Access component consists of two subcomponents: X -Pull and X -Push. The former component supports the selective distribution of the XML documents, stored in the XML Source repository according to the policies in PB using the traditional user-on-demand paradigm. By contrast, the latter component is in charge of supporting document broadcast to user groups. As such, it supports a push-based distribution of the XML documents stored at the server site. In order to support group distribution of the same document and yet to enforce selective access to different components of the document, document components are encrypted by using different keys that are generated according to the stated access control policies. Each subject in the group then receives only the keys for decrypting the document components it can access. The last component of the Author-X server is X -Update, that manages the collaborative and distributed update process described in this paper. It generates and updates all control information associated with an XML document. It also generates all certificates associated with a document according to the policies in PB, and performs the initial steps for the creation and delivery of packages. A package contains the encrypted 7 version of an XML document and the associated control information. Finally, the X -Update module manages the recovery process. In particular, X -Update uses different XML encodings for modifiable and non-modifiable atomic elements of the document, generating an XML structure called MAE, for modifiable atomic elements, and another XML structure called NMAE for non modifiable ones. Figure 15 shows an example of how X -Update encodes some atomic elements of the XML document reported in Figure 1 , before and after the encryption and control information generation processes, according to the specification of the structures T NMAE and T MAE presented in Tables 3 and 5 , respectively. The information, common to both structures and visible in the unencrypted encoding in Figure 15 (a) are: 1) an atomic element identifier (corresponding to ae id), that univocally identifies a specific modifiable/non modifiable atomic element within the document; 2) a position information (corresponding to position) that, in the case of an attribute indicates the position of that attribute within the document (P1), whereas in the case of an element indicates the position of its start-tag (P1), of the end of the start-tag (P2), and of the end-tag (P3); 3) the atomic element itself (corresponding to the atomic element content in the original XML document), that is, the tag associated with an element or the name and the corresponding value associated with an attribute. The MAE structure also contains two additional information: h ae and full, denoting respectively an hash value and a digital signature (cfr. Table 6 ). In particular note that the position information and the atomic element content are separately encrypted. The reason is that different hash values are computed over these information. The position information, that can never be modified, must be always covered by the H NMI hash value, whereas the atomic element content is covered by the hash value (stored in component H r id , if it is non-modifiable, or in prev r h and last r h, if it is modifiable) computed over all the atomic elements of its region and also by the h ae hash value, only if it is modifiable. It is important to note that the encrypted atomic element content (corresponding to the encrypted-content component) is contained within a MAE/NMAE XML structure, together with its corresponding control information, since this makes easier building the correct view at the client side, as explained in what follows. Figure 16 shows an example of authoring certificate, encoded in XML and compliant with the W3C recommendation for the generation of digital signatures [19] .
In the first portion of the certificate there is the authentication information, whereas the Object element The Author-X client side, called XML-reader, supports several functions for issuing queries and receiving query replies, and for the enforcement of the subject protocol presented in this paper. We discuss the last function in more details, since it is more relevant for the discussion in the present paper, by describing how the XML-reader generates the correct view of a received XML document using some information stored in its repositories. As shown in Figure 14 , the XML-reader manages three repositories: DocumentStore (DS), KeyStore (KS), and CertificateStore (CS). The first one records the XML document views obtained as answer to a pull request, or during a server push dissemination of XML documents, or in case of a collaborative and distributed update process. The second repository contains all keys used to decrypt the portions of the XML documents for which the subject has the proper rights. Each key has associated a document and a region identifier to identify which portions of a document can be decrypted using that key. The third repository stores all authoring certificates received from the server. To generate the correct view of an encrypted document d e , received by the server or by another subject, the XML-reader retrieves in KS the keys associated with d e and using the region identifier associated with each key decrypts all the atomic elements in d e belonging to the corresponding region. Finally, to generate a well-formed view of d e , according to the structure of the original document, the XML-reader uses the position information associated with each decrypted atomic element. In particular, that information is used to determine the correct place in the generated view, where to insert each decrypted atomic element.
Complexity Analysis of the Proposed Approach
In this section we present a complexity/cost analysis for the most relevant operations executed by the protocols on which our approach relies and we compare them with the equivalent operations executed in a conventional centralized system. In particular we evaluate the following complexity/cost measures:
2. size of exchanged information; 3. number of certificates generated for a document d; 4. execution time of the integrity check protocol and distributed view generation/decryption vs execution time of the centralized view generation/encryption and distributed decryption.
The complexity/cost is expressed in terms of several parameters that are reported in Table 7 . According to the context such parameters will be interpreted as sets of elements or as the cardinalities corresponding to these sets of elements. or the number of subjects reached by the package in a distributed and cooperative approach (a subject reached more than one time by the same package is counted exactly as many times as it is reached)
Before evaluating the above-mentioned complexity/cost measures we believe that an explanation of what a conventional centralized system means is required to better understand the comparison between our distributed approach and a centralized one. A conventional centralized system, that manages collaborative updates of an XML document, has to generate the document view for each subject involved in the collaborative process, encrypt this view with a session key (different for each subject involved) before sending the view to the proper subject s, execute the access requests received by s and decrypt the updated portions attached to the access requests (in case of update access requests). Note that access requests can be fully/partially executed or also denied, according to the identity of the requester and to the access control policies in PB. A centralized collaborative update process is realized as follows: the document server generates the view for the first chosen subject s 1 and a session key used to encrypt that view. Then, the system sends this encrypted information to s 1 . s 1 uses the attached simmetric key to decrypt the received encrypted information and then sends some access requests to the system to update the view content. The system evaluates each received access request and only when the access request is evaluated as correct wrt the identity of s 1 and the policies in PB, the system updates the document content and sends s 1 a positive response. A negative response is sent back otherwise. A subject can send more than one access request to the system that individually evaluates them. Subject s 1 at the end of its job, chooses the next subject to be involved in the collaborative update process and sends the identifier of that subject to the document server. The document server repeats the same steps followed for the first receiver, and so on.
Communication cost
The communication cost is estimated in term of the number of messages exchanged among the server and the various subjects. We estimate such cost for both a conventional centralized system and our distributed approach. We are thus able to compare those two approaches.
1. In a conventional centralized system the number of messages sent by the document server and the subjects is equal to two times the average number of access requests (AR avg ) multiplied by the number of interactions, that in this case corresponds to the number of sessions opened to issue access control requests. The resulting communication cost is thus: 2N i ·AR avg .
2. In our distributed approach the number of messages sent by the document server or by the subjects involved in the collaborative update process, is as follows:
where:
, is the number of region recovery requests. The upper bound for this parameter is (N i − 1), because the first subject receiving the package from the server does not certainly need a recovery.
, is the number of path recovery requests. Also in this case the upper bound for this parameter is (N i − 1), because the first subject receiving the package from the server does not certainly need a path recovery.
(c) (N i + 1) is the number of messages, containing the package, needed to reach, one or more times, all the interacting subjects and to return to the document server.
(d) 2(R R + P R ) is the global number of recovery requests and answers (e) 2P R (CG − 2) is the total number of path recovery requests and answers sent to/by the subjects during a collaborative update process. Whenever a path recovery request reaches the document server, the server sends all the subjects in the collaborative group, apart the path recovery request sender and the subject from which that subject has received the corrupted path, a request to obtain the last path they have received within the package.
(f) 2SRM(R R , min{P R , (N i − 2)}) is the number of sent recovery messages needed to manage R R region recovery requests, given P R path recovery requests. In particular, we consider the worst case in which both the region recovery requests and the path recovery requests are respectively sent by the last R R and P R subjects in the path. Function SRM(x, y) is defined as follows:
Note that values for variable y must be less or equal than N i − 2, because when the number of path recovery requests is equal to N i − 1 the recovery protocol does not send any region recovery message, thus the behavior followed is the same of when y = N i − 2. Moreover, for each region recovery request the server sends a number of messages, to obtain the correct version of one or more regions, equal to the number of subjects that precede the last one in the Path d , 8 and however at most CG messages. Proof: According to the analysis given above we have that in general the number of sent messages in a conventional centralized system is equal to 2N i ·AR avg , whereas in our distributed approach is estimated as follows:
It is now clear that when the hypothesis is true the number of sent messages in our distributed approach is less than the number of sent messages required in a conventional centralized system. 3
According to the above results it is clear that whether our approach is more efficient than a centralized one depends on the frequency of recovery. Based on this observation we plan to extend our system with an adaptive behaviour for recovery management. The adaptive behaviour will allow the system to use a centralized or distributed protocol according to an estimated average number of access requests and the regions/path recovery rates.
Size of exchanged information
Here we are interested in the amount of data exchanged in each step of a collaborative update process in both a conventional centralized system and in our distributed approach. Tables 8 and 9 contains data useful for such estimation in both the approaches. More precisely, in Table 8 we specify the size of the building blocks that compose a package for the centralized approach, the distributed one, and for an access request. By contrast, in Table 9 we show the size of three basic package structures that compose a package for the distributed approach: a modifiable atomic element, a modifiable region, and a path specification, in terms of the size of their building blocks.
1. In a conventional centralized system the worst case occurs when the view to be generated for the next receiver is equal to the whole XML document d. Indeed the system has to generate a simmetric session key and encrypt the whole XML document before sending it to the next receiver. 9 The system also computes a signature over the generated view and then attaches this signature to the view itself, forming a package to be sent to the designated receiver. Moreover, during a step of a centralized collaborative update process a subject s in the worst case, that is when a different access control policy applies to each atomic element and all these policies apply to s, sends a number of access requests, and corresponding updated portions, equal to AE(d), the number of atomic elements that compose d. We can estimate the amount of data exchanged between the centralized system and a subject during a step of the centralized collaborative update process as follows.
Proposition 9.2 (Size of exchanged information for the centralized approach). Let d
be an XML document, CP d be the generated corresponding package for the centralized approach, S(CP d ) be the size of CP d , and S(AR) be the size of AR, where AR is the set of access requests sent by a subject s during a step of a centralized collaborative update process. In the worst case:
Proof: The size of a package for the centralized approach and the size of the set of access requests sent by a subject during a step of a centralized collaborative update process are as follows: 2) all the regions are modifiable ones; and 3) the current subject updates all the atomic elements. The size of the information exchanged during a step of a distributed collaborative update process is equal to the size of the package sent by the current subject to the next chosen receiver. The size of such a package is defined as follows. According to the above results, it is clear that the size of exchanged information in both approaches linearly grows wrt the number of atomic elements that compose the original document, thus our distributed approach can offer a bandwidth cost similar to the one for the centralized approach. The major benefit of our approach wrt the centralized one remains the reduced number of messages sent during the collaborative update process, thus the communication cost is still the effective parameter of choice between the distributed approach and the centralized one.
Number of certificates generated for a document d
The worst case occurs when the graph representation of the document d is a list of nodes and all the policies that apply to this document contain the delete elemt privilege with propagation option equal to CASCADE. In particular, the policies apply to the document as follows: the first policy applies to the root of the document, the second policy applies to the child (second node in the list) of the document and so forth. According to this scenario the number of certificates that must be generated is equal to [
, where S j is the set of subjects satisfying the j th policy (1≤j≤P). The number of certificates is always less than or equal to
2 ). In the worst case P is equal to AE(d) and thus the number of certificates has an upper bound equal to
. Only the distributed approach presents this cost associated with the generation and dissemination of the certificates. Moreover, the possible update and/or revocation of subject credentials and access control policies add a further cost due to the generation of new certificates and the revocation of those ones no more valid. Since our distributed approach postpones these events at the end of a collaborative update process, this last cost can be managed off-line without weighing on the process itself. According to the result above to make our approach better than the centralized one we propose an adaptive system that evaluates the number of certificates to be generated before starting a collaborative process to choose the best strategy of generation and dissemination of certificates among those presented in Section 6.1.
Execution time of the integrity check protocol and distributed view generation/decryption vs execution time of the centralized view generation/encryption and distributed decryption
In this section we analyze and then we compare the time cost required to enable the next receiver to view document portions for which it possesses a privilege, and to modify the document content according to its modification rights stated in the policies belonging to the PB. In a conventional centralized system this time is spent by the centralized system to generate and encrypt the receiver document view and by the receiver to decrypt such a view, whereas in our distributed approach this time concerning the execution of the integrity check protocol, and the generation/decryption of the receiver view.
1. In a conventional centralized system the worst case occurs when a different access control policy applies to each atomic element of the document and also all these policies apply to the next receiver, implying that the view to be generated and encrypted by the centralized system and decrypted by the receiver consists of the whole document. The time required to accomplish the task of generating and encrypting the next receiver document view by the centralized system and to decrypt that view by the receiver can be evaluated as follows.
Proposition 9.4 (Centralized view generation/encryption and distributed view decryption time)
. Let d be an XML document, P be the set of access control policies that apply to d, nr be the next receiver, and T(view) be the time required by the centralized system to generate and encrypt the nr's document view and by nr to decrypt that view. In the worst case:
Proof: The time required to generate the receiver document view, takes also into account the time required for parsing the document and searching policies that apply to each parsed element. Thus in the above-mentioned worst case: a) the number of policies that apply to the document is equal to AE(d); b) the process used to find out the policy p that applies to a particular atomic element ae, implies a sequential search in the set P that stops when p is found; and c) the encryption/decryption phases have a cost in time, respectively denoted as T(view enc) and T(view dec), that is proportional to the size of the document, that is ∃c ∈ AE : T(view enc) ≤c·AE(d) and ∃c ∈ AE : T(view dec) ≤c·AE(d); it is clear that there exists a natural number c such that:
2. In our distributed approach the worst case occurs when: the number of regions R(d) is equal to the number of the atomic elements AE(d) that compose the document d; and there is at least a policy with privilege update attr that applies to each region. This is the case in which the protocol requires the highest number of operations to perform the region integrity check and the number of regions that requires such a set of operations is maximum. Moreover the receiver view to be generated and decrypted consists of the whole document. In this case the integrity check of an updatable region r requires the following steps:
(a) Integrity check of the information inserted by the last but one subject (s last−1 ) in the region r, that requires the local computation of an hash value and the decryption of a digital signature (component h c s last−1 dig-sig).
(b) Integrity check of the components h ae associated with the atomic elements belonging to r, that requires the local computation of an hash value and its comparison with the component prev r dig h.
(c) Local computation of an hash value, one for each atomic element belonging to r, over the encrypted content of an atomic element.
(d) Integrity check of the information inserted by the last subject (s last ) in the region r, that requires the local computation of an hash value and the decryption of a digital signature (component h c s last dig-sig).
(e) Check that the value contained in component last r dig h is equal to the hash value locally computed over the hash values computed over the atomic elements belonging to r.
(f) Check that the value contained in component last r h is equal to the hash value locally computed over the atomic elements belonging to r.
(g) Integrity check of the certificate inserted in the component certificates by the last subject (s last ), that requires the local computation of an hash value and the decryption of a digital signature, only if the region contains an atomic element that is an attribute, since only in this case a certificate is inserted and a correct update over that attribute can be performed by the last subject. Table 10 shows the time required to perform some basic operations, whereas Table 11 shows the time required to perform the integrity check protocol operations. 
Furthermore given the set of regions accessible by the receiver, denoted as AccReg, the view generation process requires a sequential research in the package to find out each accessible region and their atomic elements. T(view dec) ≤c·AE(d), e) cardinality of AccReg is equal to AE(d), it is clear that exists a natural number c such that:
The above results shows that both approaches require a similar time cost to enable a receiver to have access to its document view. The communication and generation/dissemination costs are the parameters according to which it is possible to choose the best approach.
Parallel Document Updates
In our current approach we assume that each subject can send the package to only one subsequent subject; therefore we disallow parallel updates to the same document. Relaxing such an assumption, and thus supporting parallel updates to documents would be however an important improvement to our protocol. Here we briefly discuss two alternative approaches referred to as restricted parallel update and fully parallel update. These approaches differ in that the first only allows parallel updates on disjoint portions of the same document, whereas the second does not impose such a restriction. The first approach can be supported by inserting some additional information in the Path d structure in order to manage the case in which a subject receives more than one package containing the same document. In particular such information, specified by the subject that sends the same package to a set of subjects, should contain for each next receiver the set of regions that could be modified by that receiver and all the subsequent receivers belonging to that new parallel path. A partition of the set R(d) of all document regions is therefore generated and a first receiver is associated with each subset of R(d) belonging to the generated partition. Moreover, all the chosen first receivers must be distinct. Whenever a subject receives more than one package, it merges all the documents obtaining a new document containing the regions modified by the subjects of the first parallel path, those modified by the subjects of the second parallel path and so forth. The structure Path d will thus contain all the parallel paths belonging to merged packages. In this scenario each time the information cycle path is updated by the server the structure Path d is not re-initialized and the portion of it that must be checked to detect a new cycle will be that following the server identifier inserted by the server itself in the Path d structure during the recovery procedure. Obviously, this check will have to be performed over all the parallel paths stored into Path d structure. It is also necessary to store in the merged package all the values of the component cycle path contained in the received packages. The second approach can be supported by storing in the package all the versions concerning the same region, that is, by keeping track of all modifications occurred to a region by giving to a set of pre-defined subjects the possibility of selecting that one that they consider the "best version". The other subjects can only add their updates to the region generating a new additional version of it. Whenever a subject receives more than one package it merges them by collecting from the received packages all the stored versions grouped by region.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed an approach for secure and selective document updates in a distributed environment. In particular, we have specified all protocols required by our approach and we have provided complexity results for the proposed approach. We plan to extend this work in several directions. A first direction concerns the extension of our approach to peer-to-peer architectures. A second direction concerns the extension of our protocols to relax the assumptions introduced in Section 4.2. To reach this goal the idea is that of recording the modification history of a document. According to this strategy, all the modifications executed by the subjects on a document are stored in the associated package and broadcasted to other subjects in the collaborative group. In this way other subjects are able to know which subjects have received that document and which privileges they have exercised on it. This approach however requires sending a higher number of messages and introducing additional control information in the package. We thus plan to offer as part of our system a suite of distributed collaborative update protocols and letting the subjects choosing the protocol to be used for a specific document, according to the trade-off they want to make between security and efficiency. A third direction deals with introducing authorizations related to the modification of document flow paths. This feature is relevant in particular in decentralized workflow management systems where decisions about routing and re-routing of documents must be taken during the workflow execution. In this respect, it is important to state authorizations specifying which subjects can modify the document flow path and under which circumstances. A fourth direction deals with revocation and updates of keys and certificates. More precisely whenever credentials associated with subjects or access control policies in PB are deleted or updated a change in the document marking and in the set of rights possessed by a subject occurs. The obvious consequence is the update of the keys used to encrypt the document portions associated with a changed marking and the re-encryption of those portions using new keys. By contrast the change in the set of rights possessed by a subject cause the revocation of the certificates that granted the rights no more available, inserting them in a Revocation List accessible by every subject involved in collaborative update processes, and the generation/dissemination of new certificates enabling that subject to exercise the new obtained rights.
A Correctness of the Subject Protocol
In this section we present correctness results for the subject protocol. The main property that this protocol assures is that a subject is not able to exercise an authoring privilege for which it does not possess the proper authorization. In particular, we show that the protocol can detect whether the document content or the control data structures have been tampered. In what follows we focus on some tampering cases, and we show how the protocol detects those incorrect modifications. Tampering cases on which we focus are the following:
1. modification of non-modifiable information;
2. modification of the document content associated with a non-modifiable region;
3. modifiable region tampering:
(a) use of an authoring privilege for which a subject does not possess the proper authorization;
(b) removal of the control information associated with a modifiable region;
(c) substitution of a modifiable region content and the corresponding control information with those of a previous version; 3.a) Use of an authoring privilege for which a subject does not possess the proper authorization.
In this case a subject illegally modifies the content of a modifiable region r id without inserting at least one authoring certificate in the component certificates associated with r id or inserting in this component one or more proper and improper authoring certificates or only improper authoring certificates.
In the former type of tampering the protocol detects the illegal modification to the content of that region, because at least one of the two hash values stored in components last r h and prev r h does not match the one locally computed over the content of r id. This is due to the fact that the malicious subject cannot modify both these control hash values according to the new illegal content of the region, because they are signed by two different subjects as required by the protocol.
In the latter type of tampering the protocol detects the illegal modification of the content of that region, because at least one of the following checks raises an error. First of all the protocol checks the integrity of the inserted certificates to detect a possible modification of their contents. Then, the protocol checks: 1) whether the subject specified in the authoring certificates matches the one declared in component s last , to detect the case in which a subject uses an authoring certificate of another subject to validate its modification; 2) whether the region specified in the authoring certificates matches r id; 3) whether the atomic elements not yet deleted and not declared as modified have kept their previous content and that the other ones declared as modified have been modified according to the privileges contained in the inserted certificates; 3.b) Removal of the control information associated with a modifiable region. This tampering cannot arise because a modification of a modifiable region identifier implies a corresponding modification of the H NMI hash value, that cannot be modified by a subject, as stated in item 1 above. Therefore it is not possible for the subject to delete a whole tuple in MR d . Moreover also assuming that the region content in d e is empty, there must still be two hash values, i.e. last r h and prev r h, signed by two different subjects, which state that the region was correctly deleted.
3.c) Substitution of a modifiable region content and the corresponding control information with those of a previous version.
In this case a malicious subject s inserts in d e and in MR d of its current package version the content associated with the atomic elements belonging to a modifiable region r id and the corresponding values for the components associated with r id in MR d , all stored in a previous version of the package. Since, according to the assumptions given in Section 7.1.2, the value of cycle path and of all involved control data structures are updated whenever a subject finds in the structure P ath d its next chosen receiver, s cannot perform such a substitution, because the control information belonging to a previous version of a package, stored in the local repository of s, was necessarily generated on a value of cycle path that is different by the current one stored in the current package received by s and moreover the current value of cycle path is not modifiable, as stated in item 1 above. A type of illegal substitution is however possible, if the following conditions are all satisfied:
1. s keeps a version of the package (pvp) that precedes the current one (cvp) that s receives;
2. among the subjects that received the package after s only one of them (sbj) modified a modifiable region r id, exercising only the update attr privilege over some its atomic elements;
the modifiable region r id results not yet confirmed in cvp.
According to the previous conditions s is able to copy in cvp the portion of pvp associated with the atomic elements belonging to r id, delete the information inserted by sbj in the tuple associated with r id in MR d of cvp and confirm the new content of r id. At this point the region has a previous content and the successor subjects are not able to detect this illegal substitution. We are however developing an approach able to address this last case, at the price however of an increased communication and storage complexity. We have outlined such an approach in the concluding section.
